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ABSTRACT 
PKI may be pushed beyond known limits 
when scaled to some visions of the smart 
grid; our research developed a simulation, 
Grid Cryptographic Simulation (GCS), to 
evaluate these potential issues, identify 
cryptographic bottlenecks, and evaluate 
tradeoffs between performance and security. 
Ultimately, GCS can be used to identify 
scalability challenges and suggest 
improvements to make PKI more efficient, 
effective, and scalable before it is deployed 
in the envisioned smart grid. 
 
1.  INTRODUCTION 
    Cryptography is critically important in the 
envisioned smart grid; current cryptographic 
systems, however, present challenges that 
may make scaling to the potentially billions 
of envisioned smart grid nodes difficult or 
impossible. Conventional wisdom holds that 
the X.509 PKI standard is the preferred 
solution for the cryptographic demands of the 
smart grid [17]. X.509, however, has 
performed poorly at large scales; previous 
work has shown that in the domain of BGP 
routing, PKI added space and time costs that 
rendered real-time performance impossible in 
as few as 30,000 nodes [23], while certificate 
revocation is unworkable with only a few 
million Web SSL servers [4]. Numerous 
challenges plagued previous deployments of 
PKI including certificate path discovery, 
excessively long revocation lists, limited 
bandwidth, and the time and space costs of 
the cryptography. In the envisioned smart 
grid specifically there are further unresolved 
questions about the semantics of certificates 
and identity. For example, who on the grid 
needs to know that this device is your smart 
refrigerator, and how do they know that? 
These challenges may be particularly acute in 
the limited bandwidth and constantly 
changing environment of the smart grid. 
 
1.1 The Smart Grid 
    The smart grid is a modern electrical grid 
that utilizes an information network to report 
data about efficiency, reliability, and power 
consumption from across an electric power 
system quickly and reliably. The goal of 
creating the information network is to ensure 
better power regulation, efficiency, and 
production while granting the consumer a 
wider range of choices regarding her own 
power consumption habits. Ultimately, the 
smart grid is a system for fine-granularity 
management of the power grid. 
    The basic unit of the consumer-side smart 
grid is the electric meter. A meter reports 
consumption and time data to a central data 
collection facility; the facility then aggregates 
data from many meters to make intelligent 
service decisions. Visions of the smart grid 
range from at minimum several hundred 
million nodes if one counts only households 
and businesses to several billion if individual 
appliances are directly connected to the grid 
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and monitored as some visions of the smart 
grid prognosticate. 
    The envisioned information network 
developed to service this data transfer will 
require stringent security measures. A 
cryptosystem is required to ensure that data is 
encrypted, authenticated, and non-repudiable 
[6]; the standard system for these 
requirements is Public Key Infrastructure. 
 
1.2 Public Key Infrastructure 
    Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) describes a 
set of standards and protocols for 
management of digital certificates that allow 
secure communication in an insecure network 
via public key cryptography. Trust roots 
issue certificates to properly-credentialed and 
authorized users; these certificates attest to 
the validity of the binding between the public 
key in the certificate and the entity that owns 
it, provide the verifier with a means to 
identify the trust root, and maintain other 
important information about the certificate 
including its expiration. The user may then 
present the certificate and some data 
enciphered by the user’s private key; if the 
data can be deciphered by the public key in 
the certificate, then the receiving party has 
reasonable proof that the certificate belongs 
to the sender, and the receiving party may 
verify these credentials and the user’s public 
key with the trust root. Users can utilize 
public/private key pairs in three primary 
ways: to securely transmit a symmetric key 
used for data transfer that is shared only for 
the duration of the session, to provide a 
mechanism for digital signatures, and to 
ensure non-repudiation [18]. 
    The simple and generic PKI model 
described above becomes significantly more 
complicated as network size and user base 
increase as do the time and space costs of the 
cryptographic computation. There may be 
myriad trust roots issuing certificates; users 
must therefore decide whether they trust the 
trust root who issued a presented certificate. 
Cross-certification between trust roots 
further complicates certificate validation as 
trust roots certify each other’s users. 
Revocation of certificates poses a greater 
challenge as trust paths become increasingly 
complex. Although PKI is straightforward in 
principle, in practice PKI reveals many 
hidden costs and challenges as the network 
and user base grow. We highlight a few 
examples of PKI challenges and potential 
smart grid scenarios in Table 1. 
 
1.3 Generic PKI Challenges 
    Deployments of PKI in industry revealed 
several unresolved challenges of PKI. Path 
discovery, the algorithm to find a trusted path 
between a user’s trust root and that of a 
presented certificate, can be difficult in a 
network of myriad trust roots. Certificate 
revocation proved to be an even greater 
challenge as revocation lists grew to an order 
of magnitude larger than expected [5] and 
alternative revocation checking algorithms 
failed to meet demand. Although a number of 
measures may be taken to alleviate specific 
PKI challenges, careful consideration must 
be given to all challenges to avoid repeating 
the errors of past PKI deployments. 
 
1.3.1 Path Discovery 
    Path discovery is the challenge of finding a 
trusted link between a presented certificate’s 
issuing authority and the set of certificate 
authorities trusted by the checking node. RFC 
3280 [9] defines the standard path discovery 
algorithm for X.509. The algorithm validates 
most fields in a given certificate, including 
the electronic signatures, before proceeding 
to validate the certificate issuer’s certificate 
information; the cycle continues until the 
algorithm discovers a common trust root or 
lack thereof [9]. In a network of more than a 
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few trust roots this problem becomes 
nontrivial as trust roots cross-certify, roots go 
out of business, or the graph of trusted roots 
simply becomes so large as to require 
nontrivial time to find a common trust root.  
 
1.3.2 Revocation Lists 
    Trust roots routinely revoke certificates for 
numerous reasons including identity 
compromise, certificate alteration, a request 
for a new certificate, periodic reissue to 
reduce the risk of certificate compromise, or 
even relatively mundane events such as an 
employee leaving a company. Revoked 
certificates must be tracked to prevent 
improper use. Industry has deployed two 
primary revocation systems: certificate 
revocation lists (CRLs) and the Online 
Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP).  
    Certificate revocation lists (CRLs), now 
the most common system, are lists of revoked 
certificates a user can search to determine if a 
presented certificate is still valid. The search 
process itself is not difficult however the lists 
themselves become untenably long. Johnson 
and Johnson, which maintains a company-
wide PKI for its 165,000 employees, 
discovered that its CRLs grew to an order of 
magnitude larger than expected, largely 
because employees would forget passwords 
and thus required a new certificate and the 
old certificate revoked. As CRLs grow, the 
bandwidth and memory overhead necessary 
to maintain CRLs across a network becomes 
significant. A modified CRL system, known 
as delta CRL, attempted to address this 
problem by only sending updates to CRLs 
across the network. Although this update 
significantly reduced the overhead required, 
transmissions still exceeded one megabyte 
weekly in a network of only 160,000 nodes 
[5]. The overhead requirements on the multi-
million node smart grid would be much 
larger, yet the memory and bandwidth 
available in the smart grid is significantly 
smaller [2]; moreover previous work has also 
shown that using revocation lists alone fails 
in only one million properly-certified nodes 
[4] and that revocation introduced significant 
security holes in client-side SSL. This 
scalability problem will be significantly 
worse in visions of the smart grid that may 
exceed one billion nodes. 
    OCSP is a server-based validation protocol 
that obviates the need for CRL transmission 
by requiring all users to transmit certificates 
to a centralized server for validation. In 
theory OCSP’s centralized model would 
alleviate the bandwidth and memory 
challenges of CRLs, however in practice 
OCSP introduced a new set of equally 
challenging problems. Users swamped the 
validation servers with requests, destroying 
real-time performance and occasionally 
crashing servers [15]. Given that reliability is 
a crucial requirement of the electric grid, 
OCSP may be unlikely to see widespread 
deployment in the envisioned smart grid. 
 
1.3.3 Countermeasures 
    Network topology or other 
implementation-specific choices can 
significantly influence the degree to which 
these challenges affect performance. 
Imposing a single trust root on the entire 
network would solve the path discovery 
problem, for example, but also results in a 
single point of failure or compromise for the 
entire network and a workflow bottleneck. 
Thus note that specific design choices may 
alleviate some of the potential problems 
identified in this section; we therefore do not 
argue that all of the discussed problems will 
necessarily be manifest in the smart grid, but 
all of them require careful consideration to 
ensure that the system deployed to the smart 
grid does not repeat the errors and omissions 
of past PKI deployments. 
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1.4 PKI Challenges in the Smart Grid 
    In addition to the generic PKI challenges 
identified we envision several challenges 
specific to the smart grid. The smart grid may 
have a fundamentally different granularity of 
certificate issue than normal PKI networks, 
there is significant industry pressure to 
minimize overhead cryptographic costs, and 
data in the smart grid must be read, 
aggregated, and acted upon more frequently 
than in standard PKI systems. 
 
1.4.1 Non-Static Entities 
    Some visions of the smart grid envisage 
granularity of control and data collection at 
the appliance level rather than the aggregated 
electric meter [17]. Such functionality would 
appear to require that appliances possess 
appropriate cryptographic credentials to take 
part in these communications.   While meters 
are relatively static and are generally owned 
and operated by an individual or company, 
appliances are dynamic and may change 
ownership frequently; moreover, there may 
be myriad certificate sources depending on 
where the client buys the appliance and who 
issues the certificate. Each time an appliance 
changes ownership a new certificate must be 
issued and the old certificate revoked; this 
problem exacerbates the revocation 
challenges identified earlier. Moreover, there 
are a number of open questions regarding 
these “appliance” certificates – who needs to 
know that it is your refrigerator, how do they 
know that, and what are the privacy 
implications of such transparency? Who 
enforces a change-of-ownership certificate 
update? Who are the relying parties who 
must work with those appliances? These 
unresolved issues require careful thought and 
exploration before such granularity of control 
is deployed in the smart grid. 
 
 
1.4.2 Speed versus Capacity 
    PKI is expensive in time, memory, and 
computation; as we mentioned, PKI renders 
real-time control impossible in as few as 
30,000 nodes (in BGP) [23]. In the smart grid 
many control decisions must be made nearly 
in real time to avoid blackouts or other severe 
service interruptions. There is thus a tension 
between real-time performance and security; 
PKI itself may destroy real-time 
performance, but with no security the grid is 
unprotected. Even in grid contexts where 
real-time performance is not critical, such as 
sending meter data, the overhead time, 
bandwidth, and memory costs of PKI may 
prove prohibitive. There is thus significant 
room for research into the overhead costs of 
PKI and discovering what bottlenecks may 
be easily relieved to improve performance. 
    Capacity, defined as the number of clients 
that can be served by a single server within a 
given time period, is also a critical 
component of the envisioned grid. 
Maintaining servers is expensive and there is 
therefore significant economic pressure to 
increase the capacity of servers in the 
network [2]. This incentive is at cross-
purposes with security considerations as 
security operations often add considerable 
time and computational overhead. Thus a 
careful balance must be struck between 
security and capacity; the relatively large 
overhead demand of PKI may thus be 
prohibitive. Many industry contacts have 
informed us that most utilities choose to 
maximize capacity at the expense of security 
[2]. 
 
1.4.3 Aggregation 
    Smart meter or appliance data must be read 
and potentially aggregated numerous times, 
from the utility level to the regulatory level to 
even potentially the Federal Energy 
Regulatory Commission. In the general PKI 
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setting, at every point where the data is read 
or aggregated, the certificate of each sending 
node must be verified to ensure integrity. The 
computational overhead required to service 
so many requests grows quickly as reporting 
network size increases. Even in the  
cryptographically simplest case, where data  
 
is aggregated at each step and re-encrypted 
with a new local key pair, in the fully general 
case the computational overhead in the 
envisioned billion-node grid is potentially 
greater than in any other network in the 
world. We must carefully measure these 
aggregation challenges before deployment. 
 
PKI Challenge Scenario 
  
Path Discovery Smart meter certified by trust root A reports usage data to regulatory authority B which is certified by trust root C. 
Revocation Utility A upgrades 10,000 smart meters requiring new certificates. The old certificates are added to the growing revocation list. 
Non-Static Entities 
Alice purchases a refrigerator from store A with an initial certificate 
issued by trust root B. Alice then sells her refrigerator to Bob requiring 
revocation of the refrigerator’s “Alice” certificate from trust root A 
and issuance of new “Bob” certificate to the refrigerator from trust 
root B. 
Speed versus Capacity 
Utility A must choose whether to connect 10,000 or 100,000 smart 
meters to a single server resulting in an order of magnitude difference 
in initial and maintenance costs. 
Aggregation 
Utility A owns 100,000 smart meters. Groups of 10,000 nodes report 
to local data collection centers; the data is then retransmitted to the 
utility and finally on to the regulatory authorities. At each step the data 
is decrypted, parsed, and re-encrypted. If at each step the data is 
aggregated, then a single compromised aggregator could cause 
significant harm to the grid. If signatures are simply accumulated, then 
the messages become significantly longer, as does the task of 
validating each signature. 
  Table 1: Scenarios in the Envisioned Smart Grid for each Potential PKI Challenge 
 
1.5 Previous Work 
    Several researchers have contributed 
significantly to our understanding of the 
limitations of PKI.  
    Zhao, Smith, and Nicol studied the 
practical constraints of using PKI to create 
secure BGP. Zhao created a PKI simulation 
based on the SSFNet framework that 
simulated nearly 35,000 autonomous 
systems [21]; the simulated autonomous 
systems used the X.509 standard for 
authentication and integrity checks. Zhao 
found that in as few as 30,000 nodes the 
practical constraints of PKI significantly 
increased latency and rendered real-time 
control impossible [22]. The envisioned 
smart grid will include potentially several 
billion nodes. With significant performance 
degradation and no real-time control in only 
30,000 nodes [23], we hypothesize that the 
performance effects in a multi-billion node 
network will be much more severe.  
    Grant studied the relative benefits of 
numerous proposed changes to the standard 
X.509 PKI architecture; her conclusion that 
the recommendations of the Certification 
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Authority and Browser Forum (CABF) 
should be strengthened influenced our 
selection of network protocols for the PKI 
simulation and will provide an excellent 
starting point for further research and 
analysis of alternative grid PKI systems [4].  
   Smith later condensed these potential 
smart grid challenges in his extended 
abstract elucidating potential challenges to 
the smart grid; our work is built directly on 
Smith’s probing questions [17]. 
    Numerous researchers are also 
investigating alternatives to PKI in the smart 
grid. The most compelling active research 
comes from Los Alamos National 
Laboratory where a research team 
demonstrated the viability of quantum 
cryptography in the smart grid, although the 
hardware remains prohibitively expensive 
[50]. Other cryptographic systems, including 
several symmetric key algorithms, are 
already used in the grid but there is no clear 
consensus for specific protocols or usage. 
 
2. MOTIVATION FOR GCS 
    There is significant potential for error or 
cryptosystem failure if standard X.509 is 
simply scaled to a network the size of the 
smart grid without modification. We 
therefore created a simulation to model PKI 
in the envisioned smart grid and identify 
possible bottlenecks and challenges before 
PKI is widely deployed. Our goal is to build 
a simulation that will quantify those 
bottlenecks, provide a framework to 
evaluate cryptographic and performance 
tradeoffs, and explore the viability of 
alternatives to generic PKI.1 Ultimately our 
goal is to ensure that whatever cryptosystem 
is deployed in the smart grid will have the 
best chance of success with minimal 
performance or security compromise. 
                                                
1 There is significant precedent for large-scale 
simulation in the smart grid [1] [3][24] 
3. SSFNET 
3.1 Previous Work in SSFNet 
    Discrete-event simulation models a 
system as a sequence of scheduled events 
that change the state of the system [16]. The 
PRIME family of discrete event simulators, 
comprised of PRIME, SSF, SSFNet, 
PrimoGENI,2 and S3F, is a standard for 
academic research in network simulations 
[19]. We thus decided to begin our work in 
SSFNet, the PRIME simulation framework 
with the most support for large-scale 
discrete-event simulation with TCP/IP 
support [11]; moreover, numerous other 
scholars have used PRIME simulators—in 
2005 Zhao created a simulation of PKI in 
Prime SSF to evaluate the security 
implications of PKI in BGP [24].  
    In 2011 Mercado unsuccessfully ported 
Zhao’s PKI components to PRIME SSFNet; 
despite his best efforts the PRIME SSFNet 
framework was not compatible with Zhao’s 
code [13]. Our work in turn builds on the 
efforts of both Zhao and Mercado; our first 
attempt to build a simulation of PKI in the 
envisioned smart grid was to work with 
Mercado’s code and again attempt to port it 
into SSFNet. We initially decided to attempt 
to continue Mercado’s work porting Zhao’s 
code to PRIME SSFNet because PRIME’s 
real-time simulation strategy allows it to 
interact with real network applications [12], 
a potentially powerful tool that would enable 
us to use deployed industry network code in 
our simulations. Despite some initial success 
building on Mercado’s work, our attempts to 
transfer the code to SSFNet also proved 
unsuccessful for the same compatibility 
                                                
2 PrimoGENI is a version of SSFNet adapted to work 
with the Global Environment for Network 
Innovations (GENI). PrimoGENI was newly released 
when we started our work and now that it has been 
thoroughly tested would likely be the best simulator 
for further research [20] 
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issues Mercado encountered [13]. We thus 
decided to build our own PKI simulation 
module in SSFNet3 from scratch. 
 
3.2 SSFNet Simulation 
    Creating a PKI module within the PRIME 
SSFNet framework proved more challenging 
than anticipated. The base code failed to 
compile on any of our lab machines; errors 
ranged from #include failures to unknown 
data types. After nearly six weeks of 
experimentation, code checks, and support 
from Dr. Miguel Erazo at FIU, we 
discovered that the PRIME SSFNet 
framework could only be compiled in the 
deprecated g++ 4.1.2 in Ubuntu 10.04.4 
    After successful compilation we began to 
write a PKI module for SSFNet. Modules in 
SSFNet are not trivially defined; each new 
module must implement its own network 
stack and application layer using prototypes 
defined within SSFNet’s base simulation 
code. We therefore first attempted to build 
an application-layer module on a copy of the 
existing TCP/IP network stack; however the 
existing TCP/IP stack failed to communicate 
with our application. After a series of 
discussions with Dr. Erazo, we were unable 
to identify the source of the error although 
we believed that the existing TCP stack code 
relied on a number of hard-wired 
application-layer function calls that we 
either could not locate or were running in 
the background simulation support code and 
would be dangerous to alter. Dr. Erazo 
advised us to write our own network stack to 
avoid these issues. David Rice proceeded to 
begin work on the TCP/IP stack while 
                                                
3 We also briefly considered changing to the second-
generation SSF simulation, S3F [14], however the 
S3F project is still relatively new and untested 
4 It may be possible to compile SSFNet in other 
operating systems however the g++ 4.1.2 is a firm 
requirement. 
Tucker Ward continued to develop the 
application-layer PKI module.  
    Writing a new module proved equally 
problematic as compiling. For nearly 15 
weeks we continued to write and test 
module code; despite continued support 
from FIU and long debugging hours our 
module code simply did not communicate 
with the SSFNet simulation framework. We 
eventually traced this error to a function 
type conflict that could not be resolved. At 
run time the SSFNet base code expects the 
user to define a function that calls the 
network functions that move packets 
through the TCP/IP stack. However, in order 
to compile, the base code required the user 
to implement this same function with a 
completely different set of parameters. The 
result was that we were forced to make code 
that either did not compile or would call the 
wrong function at runtime. We confirmed 
this issue with Dr. Erazo and together were 
unable to find a solution. 
 
3.3 NS3 Simulation 
    In December 2012, we finally decided to 
abandon PRIME altogether. In consultation 
with Professor David Nichol at the 
University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign, 
we elected to continue simulation 
development in the NS3 simulation 
environment. Work on the new NS3 
simulation began in January 2013; Tucker 
Ward completed all further work on this 
project. 
 
4.  GCS SPECIFICATIONS 
4.1 Overview 
    GCS is built on the ns-3.16 framework 
publicly available at http://www.nsnam.org/. 
New users wishing to run the simulation 
code should download the simulation tarball 
and build NS3 using the instructions on the 
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NS3 website.5 Please contact the author of 
this report for the additional GCS code. Waf 
will automatically build the GCS simulation 
assuming NS3 is correctly installed. 
    We determined simulation protocols and 
parameters from best estimates from 
conversations with industry contacts and 
from open-domain sources. We designed the 
code to allow for easy parameter or protocol 
changes in the event that the user generates 
new best estimates. 
 
4.1 Modules 
    GCS adapts two primary modules from 
NS3. The TCP/IP network implementation 
is used unaltered from the base NS3 code. 
The application-layer PKI code, however, is 
an extensively edited version of the OnOff 
Application from the base NS3 code. All 
PKI code executes in the application layer. 
 
4.2 Software Architecture 
    GCS builds extensively on the NS3 base 
code. There is no native support for PKI 
simulation in NS3 excepting support for a 
standard TCP/IP network stack. GCS is thus 
built on heavily modified applications from 
the NS3 base. The simulation is generally 
speaking built on a standard client/server 
model in which the client reports grid data to 
a server; the server then either aggregates 
data and sends it to higher-order server or 
collects the data for analysis. For modularity 
and ease of modification the GCS code is 
contained entirely within two application 
files and one topology file. We altered no 
other NS3 base code. 
 
Client 
     The GCS client is an extensively 
modified version of NS3’s native OnOff 
application. OnOff offers the nearest proxy 
                                                
5http://www.nsnam.org/docs/release/3.14/tutorial/sin
glehtml/index.html 
to a smart meter as its purpose is to report 
data to a central server at regularly-
scheduled intervals. The code, however, was 
almost entirely replaced to support PKI and 
now only the transmission scheduling 
function and the destroyer are original to 
NS3; less than 10% of the existing code is 
taken from the OnOff base. 
 
Server 
    The GCS server is an extensively 
modified version of NS3’s native 
PacketSink application. PacketSink is a 
server model that accepts data from any 
other application in NS3. PacketSink is less 
extensively altered than OnOff, but is still 
less than 30% original to NS3. 
 
Topology 
    The topology file, pki_grid.cc, is entirely 
our work although it was in part inspired by 
examples found in the NS3 codebase. The 
default topology is a star network with 
default size and parameters described below. 
 
4.3 Protocols 
4.3.1 Overview 
    GCS simulates the X.509 PKI protocol. 
Each node maintains a simplified certificate 
struct that contains an expiration time, the 
certificate issuer, the node’s ID number, and 
some bookkeeping information—all of the 
information necessary for a simulation to 
emulate real PKI but simplified to conserve 
memory. GCS conducts most functions of 
PKI except cryptography; GCS verifies, 
issues, revokes, and transmits certificates 
and data as in a real X.509 deployment. We 
simulate encryption and decryption simply 
by adding constant time to the simulation 
clock and transmission by adding a constant 
to the bandwidth usage in proportion to the 
number of certificates in the certificate chain 
of a given transmission. Once two nodes 
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validate each other’s certificates a session 
key is randomly generated and data 
transmitted between the two nodes, although 
the actual encryption/decryption again is 
simulated simply by adding constant clock 
time. Digital signatures and non-repudiation 
thus may be simulated by simply ignoring 
the key pair and validating the certificates. 
 
4.3.2 Certificate Issue 
    Simulated trust roots issue new 
certificates to nodes when a node’s 
certificate is revoked either through 
expiration or failure to authenticate. The 
trust root gives the certificate an expiration 
time, records is trust root ID, and assigns the 
certificate a sequential number for 
individual certificate identification. The trust 
root sends the new certificate to the 
respective node and the node adopts it for 
use. Identity checks are simulated by adding 
constant time to the simulation clock before 
the node may use the new certificate; 
although this practice inverts the real-world 
order of operations, the net effect is the 
same and it simplifies certificate issue. 
 
4.3.3 Certificate Revocation and Expiration 
    Certificate reissue occurs because either 
the original certificate expired or GCS 
randomly selects it for revocation. The trust 
root handles certificate renewal by simply 
issuing a new certificate to the node. The 
trust root furthermore adds the old certificate 
to the certificate revocation list (CRL) until 
it expires. Expired certificates are not kept 
on the CRL as nodes are expected to verify 
the expiration date of all certificates 
presented for authentication. Random 
revocation occurs by default with a 
frequency determined by a simulation 
constant. Nonrandom revocation is also 
supported but must be specified in the 
topology file. Revocation simulates the 
range of real-world scenarios in which a 
certificate may be revoked in the smart grid: 
a user forgets a password, a user breaks an 
appliance, a hacker compromises a utility, or 
a utility goes out of business, among others. 
GCS provides extensive capabilities to 
specify revocation policies and events. 
 
4.4 Simulation Parameters 
    Based on conversations with industry 
contacts, we used the following default 
parameters for consumer-side simulation in 
a small geographic network: 
 
Data Payload: 2 kB 
Report Frequency: 15 minutes to 6 hours 
Transport/Network Protocol: TCP/IP 
Certificate Revocation Rate:  
    0.01% - 0.10% per day 
Bidirectional Communication: 95% uplink,      
    5% downlink communication 
Network Topology: Star or Radio Mesh 
 
     Best-estimate parameters: 
 
Neighborhood Size:6 10,000 nodes 
Utility Size:7 1 – 100 neighborhoods 
Total Network Nodes: 10 million 
Relying Parties: Utilities and a “Regulator”  
 
4.5 Statistics Gathering 
    GCS gathers the following statistics: 
• Average bandwidth used per link 
over time. Average bandwidth 
indicates how much bandwidth will 
be required for a given link in the 
network. 
                                                
6 “Neighborhood” simply denotes a set of data 
collection nodes that roughly corresponds to a base 
unit – either residential, industrial, or commercial. 
The size may be trivially adjusted to reflect any 
particular network size desired. 
7 “Utility” denotes the size of a nontrivial power 
production unit, such as NSTAR in New England 
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• Average latency per link. Latency 
data will assist in emergency and 
control planning where response 
time must be in milliseconds. 
• Peak bandwidth per link. Peak 
bandwidth will help engineers plan 
for worst-case failure scenarios in 
which a data overload saturates a 
network. 
• Peak latency per link. Peak latency 
gives the researcher a sense of the 
upper tolerances of the network 
under extreme conditions. 
• Certification revocation list size. 
CRL size is a critical metric for 
determining how much 
computational and bandwidth 
resource is required in a given 
network simply to support the PKI 
operations. 
• PKI computational overhead time 
cost. Overhead cost helps engineers 
determine minimum hardware and 
software benchmarks for successful 
deployment in the smart grid. 
• Certificate validation time and 
memory cost. Time and memory cost 
indicate how feasible PKI may be on 
smaller machines with limited 
bandwidth access. 
• Packet traces. Packet traces assist in 
simulation debugging and any fine 
granularity analysis. 
 
    GCS can be easily extended to gather or 
analyze additional statistics as desired. 
 
4.6 Current Simulation Status 
    The GCS code modules are 
approximately 1500 lines of C++ code built 
on the NS3 framework; simulation 
topologies vary from only dozens of lines of 
code to several hundred depending on user 
specifications. The basic star network 
topology is already ready for demonstration 
and thorough testing while the radio mesh 
topology is under development. Unusual 
network topologies or deviations from 
standard PKI protocols are trivially possible 
by modifying the topology or protocol files. 
We designed GCS to abstract away many of 
the underlying NS3 code allowing a 
relatively new programmer to edit and run 
the simulation without knowing the details 
of NS3. GCS is ready for data collection but 
we will continue to expand its repertoire of 
simulation models and topologies. 
 
4.7 Simulation Testing and Topology 
    GCS has been thoroughly tested on a 
number of small and large grid topologies. 
We verified the accuracy of statistics 
gathering by running two small-scale 
simulations of 12 nodes in three stars 
network topology with predictable network 
traffic that was verified manually. We then 
scaled testing to a much larger 10,000 nodes 
in 100 stars topology and ran the simulation 
for three simulated days. The larger test 
simulates a metropolitan topology of at most 
two electric regulators collecting data solely 
from smart meters reporting to designated 
data collection servers as might be found in 
most medium-sized cities in the United 
States. More or less complex topologies, 
including data collection from or control of 
appliances, additional electric regulators, or 
stress conditions such as a high number of 
trust roots may be simulated by carefully 
changing simulation constants, although 
network traffic protocol or routing changes 
would require minor code alterations. 
    The flexibility and testing of GCS thus 
provides for a wide variety of further 
simulations and network topologies. The 
benefits and costs of collecting data from or 
even controlling individual appliances may 
be assessed simply by adding an additional 
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layer of endpoints in the simulation and 
requiring those nodes to report to the 
connected smart meter node. Larger 
networks, such as those for large cities, 
states, or even an entire country may be 
simulated fairly trivially by increasing the 
size of the simulation, the number of trust 
roots, the number of electric regulators, and 
modifying simulation traffic to more closely 
match a national average than any regional 
variations. GCS may also prove useful on 
smaller scales if, for example, a researcher 
desired to test the viability of multiple trust 
roots within a relatively small and localized 
network—as may be the case in some sort of 
regulatory headquarters to which many 
utilities report data. Ultimately, with 
minimal modification GCS may be used to 
simulate nearly any network that may be 
represented as a star or mesh network of 
nodes using X.509 PKI. 
 
5.  FUTURE WORK 
    The star topology simulation is ready for 
deployment and large-scale data collection, 
although periodic refinements of the 
simulation parameters and topology are 
expected. Future researchers may use this 
simulation to collect data and discover the 
practical performance of PKI in a smart grid 
network. Once bottlenecks are identified, 
alternative PKI schemes, network 
topologies, or other heuristics may be 
explored to identify simple solutions to the 
complex problems PKI may pose in the 
envisioned smart grid.  
 
6.  CONCLUSION 
    The envisioned smart grid will require a 
robust cryptosystem to meet the demands of 
confidentiality, integrity, and availability. 
Conventional wisdom holds that Public Key 
Infrastructure is the best solution. However, 
deployed PKIs demonstrated a number of 
challenges including path discovery and 
revocation issues while we envision several 
smart grid-specific challenges such as non-
static entities, speed versus capacity 
tradeoffs, and aggregation. In addition to 
those challenges, the potential billion-node 
network of the smart grid will be larger than 
any PKI previously deployed; in short, in the 
smart grid, PKI may be pushed beyond 
known limits and must go where no PKI has 
gone before. We therefore constructed a 
simulation of PKI in the smart grid, GCS, 
that based on the NS3 simulation 
environment and can identify which of those 
challenges may pose serious threats to grid 
integrity and performance.  
    GCS can simulate a wide variety of grids, 
topologies, protocols, and even non-grid 
networks. GCS can be modified to simulate 
nearly any level of grid communications 
infrastructure. The GCS default is to 
simulate a network of smart meters reporting 
to centralized utility data servers; with minor 
modifications to the protocols and frequency 
of reporting, GCS can simulate, for 
example, the command and control 
functions of generation, transmission, and 
power distribution, a utility-wide 
data/regulatory communications network, a 
federal regulatory authority’s 
communication and control network, or even 
a combined data, control, and regulatory 
network of any reasonable size. GCS can 
also simulate at the finer granularity of 
smart appliances or even smart appliance 
command and control. Each of these 
network types may be arbitrarily large, 
constrained only by the computational 
resources available. In addition to network 
type and topology, GCS may be easily 
modified to simulate protocols other than the 
X.509 PKI standard; other variations of PKI 
or even a different authentication system, 
such as symmetric key, may be examined by 
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re-tooling the protocol code within GCS. 
GCS can even simulate non-grid networks; 
although nodes in GCS are considered to be 
smart meters, with minor modifications their 
behavior may be adjusted to match personal 
computers or any other computational 
device to simulate a wide range of real-
world networks. GCS is a robust and 
malleable tool for simulating a wide range 
of networks. 
    GCS simulations can clarify many 
potential problems in large-scale 
cryptosystems and evaluate potential 
tradeoffs. Potential tradeoffs include the 
effect of imposing a single trust root on the 
grid versus security, the effect of only 
checking for certificate revocation every n 
times a node is presented with the 
certificate, the effect of increasing or 
decreasing the expiration time of a 
certificate, the effect of enforcing separate 
PKIs for data and control systems, the effect 
of data aggregation at each regulatory level 
or forwarding the data directly, or even the 
effect of enforcing command-only PKI and 
not encrypting usage data. Simulations will 
also quantify the range of potential issues 
discussed in this paper, from bandwidth 
utilization to CRL growth to latency. Using 
the data collected when evaluating the 
above-mentioned potential tradeoffs can 
help industry and government make better 
decisions based on clear, quantifiable 
criteria for the envisioned smart grid. 
    We hope to use GCS to identify and 
alleviate PKI issues before PKI is widely 
deployed in the smart grid. GCS is a robust 
base that can be easily modified to simulate 
nearly any PKI deployment in the 
envisioned smart grid, and our ultimate goal 
is to identify and quantify potential 
challenges and bottlenecks before any 
cryptosystem is deployed to the envisioned 
smart grid. 
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